@conference {
	title = {Coalition Formation in MANETS},
	author = {Jiang, Tao., Theodorakopoulos, George., Baras, John S.},
	year = {2006},
	month = {11/2006},
	abstract = {Wireless ad-hoc networks rely on the cooperation of participating nodes for almost all their functions. However, due to resource constraints, nodes are generally selfish and try to maximize their own benefit when participating in the network. Therefore, it is important to study mechanisms which can be used as incentives to form coalitions inside the network. In this paper, we study coalition formation based on game theory, especially cooperative game theory. First, the dynamics of coalition formation proceeds via pairwise bargaining. We show that the size of the maximum coalition is a decreasing function of the cost for establishing a link. After the coalition formation process reaches the steady state, we are interested in the stability of coalitions. We prove that coalitions are stable in terms of both pairwise stability and coalitional stability.},
	address = {Orlando, FL},
	booktitle = {25th Army Science Conference},
	pages = {pp.1-8}
}
@conference {
	title = {Trust Evaluation in Anarchy: A Case Study on Autonomous Networks},
	author = {Jiang, Tao., Baras, John S.},
	year = {2006},
	month = {04/2006},
	abstract = {With the explosive growth of network techniques, in particular wireless communications, the traditional centralized, fixed networks can no longer satisfy the enormous demands on network connectivity, data storage and information exchanges. New types of networks, such as pervasive computing networks, mobile ad hoc networks and P2P networks, emerged in recent years in order to provide solutions for the increasing requirements on networked services. All those networks are autonomous networks, because they are distributed and self-organized. As a case study, we employ a specific application {\textendash} distributed trust management {\textendash} to understand and analyze the behavior and properties of these {\textquotedblleft}anarchical{\textquotedblright} autonomous networks. We propose a statistical trust evaluation rule, prove its convergence and investigate its characteristics when the system is at the steady state. Our investigation results in several conclusions for the design of trust evaluation rules, some of which are unexpected if we do not have the stationary distribution at hand. Our study shows the importance and necessity of applying theoretical analyses to understand the complex characteristics of distributed, self-organized, autonomous networks.},
	address = {Barcelona, Spain},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 25th IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (Infocom06)}
}
@conference {
	title = {Coalition Formation in MANET and Other Networks},
	author = {Jiang, Tao., Theodorakopoulos, George., Baras, John S.},
	year = {2006},
	month = {01/2006},
	abstract = {Wireless ad-hoc networks rely on the cooperation of participating nodes for almost all their functions. However, due to resource constraints, nodes are generally selfish and try to maximize their own benefit when participating in the network. Therefore, it is important to study mechanisms which can be used as incentives to form coalitions inside the network. In this paper, we study coalition formation based on game theory, especially cooperative game theory. First, the dynamics of coalition formation proceeds via pairwise bargaining. We show that the size of the maximum coalition is a decreasing function of the cost for establishing a link. After the coalition formation process reaches the steady state, we are interested in the stability of coalitions. We prove that coalitions are stable in terms of both pairwise stability and coalitional stability.},
	address = {Orlando, FL},
	booktitle = {25th Army Science Conference}
}
