@conference {
	title = {Intrusion Detection System Resiliency to Byzantine Attacks: The Case Study of Wormholes in OLSR},
	author = {Baras, John S., Radosavac, Svetlana., Theodorakopoulos, George., Sterne, Dan., Budulas, Peter., Gopaul, Richard.},
	year = {2007},
	month = {10/2007},
	abstract = {In this paper, we extend the work presented in [1] by quantifying the effects of in-band wormhole attacks on Intrusion Detection Systems. More specifically, we propose a mathematical framework for obtaining performance bounds of Byzantine attackers and the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in terms of detection delay. We formulate the problem of distributed collaborative defense against coordinated attacks in MANET as a dynamic game problem. In our formulation, we have on the one hand a group of attackers that observe what is going on in the network and coordinate their attack in an adaptive manner. On the other side, we have a group of defending nodes (the IDS nodes) that collaboratively observe the network and coordinate their actions against the attackers. Using extensions of the game theoretic framework of [2] we provide a mathematical framework for efficient identification of the worst attacks and damages that the attackers can achieve, as well as the best response of the defenders. This approach leads to quantifying resiliency of the routing-attack IDS with respect to Byzantine attacks.},
	address = {Orlando, FL},
	booktitle = {2007 Military Communication Conference},
	pages = {pp. 1-7}
}
@conference {
	title = {Malicious Users in Unstructured Networks},
	author = {Theodorakopoulos, George., Baras, John S.},
	year = {2007},
	month = {05/2007},
	abstract = {Unstructured networks (like ad-hoc or peer-to-peer networks) are networks without centralized control of their operation. Users make local decisions regarding whether to follow the network protocol or not. While providing scalability benefits, this degrades the performance, which is compounded by the potential presence of Malicious Users. In general, these users are trying to disrupt the operation of the network, and prevent the legitimate users from achieving their objectives. More specifically, they could try to break the connectivity of the network, or waste the resources of the legitimate users. In this work we use game theory to examine the effect of Malicious Users. All users are modeled as payoff-maximizing strategic agents. A simple model, fictitious play, is used for the legitimate user behavior, but no limits are imposed on the Malicious Users strategies. We look for the worst case equilibrium: the one that gives Malicious Users the highest payoff. We identify the importance of the network topology.},
	address = {Anchorage, Alaska},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 26th Annual IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (Infocom)},
	pages = {pp. 884-891}
}
