@conference {
	title = {Linear Quadratic Games with Costly Measurements},
	author = {Maity, Dipankar., Anastasopoulos, Achilleas. , Baras, John S.},
	year = {2017},
	month = {12/2017},
	abstract = {In this work we consider a stochastic linear quadratic two-player game.The state measurements are observed through a switched noiseless communication link. Each player incurs a finite cost every time the link is established to get measurements. Along with the usual control action, each player is equipped with a switching action to control the communication link. The measurements help to improve the estimate and hence reduce the quadratic cost, but at the same time the cost is increased due to switching. We study the subgame perfect equilibrium control and switching strategies for the players. We show that the problem can be solved in a two-step process by solving two dynamic programming problems. The first step corresponds to solving a dynamic programming for the control strategy and the second step involves solving another dynamic programming for the switching strategy.},
	address = {Melbourne, Australia},
	booktitle = {56th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC 2017)},
	pages = {pp. 6223-6228}
}
@conference {
	title = {Linear Quadratic Stochastic Differential Games under Asymmetric Value of Information},
	author = {Maity, Dipankar., Baras, John S.},
	year = {2017},
	month = {07/2017},
	abstract = {This paper considers a variant of two-player linear quadratic stochastic differential games. In this framework, none of the players have access to the state observations for all the time, which restricts the possibility of continuous feedback strategies. However, they can observe the state intermittently at discrete time instances by paying some finite cost. Having on demand costly measurements ensure that open-loop strategy is not the only strategy for this game. The individual cost functions for each player explicitly incorporate the value of information and the asymmetry that comes along with different costs of state observation for different players. We study the structural properties of the Nash equilibrium for this particular class of problems when the cost of observation is finite and positive. We show that the game problem simplifies into two decoupled game problems: one for deciding the control strategies, and the other for deciding the observation acquisition times. The study also reveals that under two extreme cases -cost of observation being 0 or $\infty$- the strategies coincide with feedback and open-loop strategies respectively.},
	address = {Toulouse, France},
	booktitle = {IFAC 2017 World Conference},
	pages = {pp. 9287-9292}
}
@conference {
	title = {Asymptotic Policies for Stochastic Differential Linear Quadratic Games with Intermittent State Feedback},
	author = {Maity, Dipankar., Baras, John S.},
	year = {2017},
	month = {07/2017},
	abstract = {In this paper, we consider infinite horizon linear quadratic stochastic differential games where the games are neither open-loop nor closed-loop. The state of the game dynamics is measured only when a certain switch is closed. The switch requires unanimous operation by the players, and continuum state measurements are not possible. There is an upper bound on the number of times the switch can be closed. Each player is given a quadratic cost function and the objective of each player is to design a switching strategy and a control strategy in order to optimize their respective cost function. We investigate the Nash control strategy and optimal switching policy for this game with two different cost structures: discounted cost and average-time cost.},
	address = {Valletta, Malta},
	booktitle = {25th Mediterranean Conference on Control and Automation (MED 2017)},
	pages = {pp. 117-122}
}
@conference {
	title = {Stochastic Differential Linear-Quadratic Games with Intermittent Asymmetric Observations},
	author = {Maity, Dipankar., Raghavan, Aneesh., Baras, John S.},
	year = {2017},
	month = {05/2017},
	abstract = {In this paper, we consider a two-players stochastic linear quadratic game framework. The game is partially observed and each player has their own private observation. The challenge is that none of the players has access to the continuum observations, rather they can access their respective observations at discrete time instances by operating a switch unanimously. The operation of the switch is costly and hence the gathering of the observations are costly. Each player is equipped with finite memory and she can only use the latest observation to construct the control strategy. The private observations of the players lead to a source of asymmetry in this game. Moreover, the players have different costs for operating the switch, which is another source of asymmetry. We study the structural properties of the Nash equilibrium for this particular class of problems and then we finally show that the switching problem simplifies to a bi-objective optimization problem.},
	address = {Seattle, WA},
	booktitle = {2017 American Control Conference},
	pages = {pp. 3670-3675},
	organization = {Sheraton Seattle Hotel}
}
